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Abstract: Based on the example of the automobile and electronics sector in china, the article examines the technological learning of companies in china and the way it is influenced by industrial policy. companies have consolidated their production capacity and technological learning but are rarely in a position to develop an innovation capability. the article shows the diversity of enterprises and identifies two opposing modes of development, either based on technological transfers of foreign technologies mainly through state-owned enterprises or based on assimilation and learning of technologies acquired through the clients in private or foreignowned companies or other new enterprises of a rather small size. the latter are less favored by official policies and have difficulty obtaining the advantages that may have been available through the national innovation system (training, higher education, research, technical centers, funding). this separation of the innovation system promoted by the government and the industrial system that was created through technological learning is, in the authors' opinion, the main reason for the low innovation capability of chinese industry. the coexistence of these two different modes is a characteristic feature of china and explains why china does
For the twenty-five-year period from 1978 to 2002, the size of the Chinese economy grew 6.4 times, with an average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 9.3 percent, whereas the gross national product (GNP) per inhabitant experienced an annual growth of 8.1 percent. In 2003, the country's GDP put China at number six among the world's economies. It is common to say, given these impressive figures, that China has created an "economic miracle" (Lin, Cai, and Li 1999) , an expression derived from the term "Asian miracle" used by the World Bank to characterize the growth of Asian countries (World Bank 1993) . However, this same qualification coined for the Chinese economy carries a reminder of the strong criticism made of the famous Asian miracle. Paul Krugman (1994) for instance, using calculations of total factor productivity (TFP), in a famous paper in Foreign affairs, attributed the remarkable growth of Asian countries to the simple accumulation of capital and employment, and only very marginally to technological change. By signaling that such growth was mainly obtained through the mobilization of resources and not by increasing productivity, Krugman called the Asian miracle into question. He said that the idea was a myth and predicted that the growth in question would come to a halt because of diminishing yields from input factors. If Krugman is right, isn't China's great economic rise just another myth of the same miracle? Is China's growth any different from the Asian model characterized by Krugman? This question is the starting point of our research.
Two Theoretical Approaches to Analyzing Economic Growth
How can China's rapid growth be explained? One approach is careful econometric calculation based on orthodox economics and following the neoclassical theory on economic growth: the increase of national revenue or gross domestic production. The new classical approach focuses on the production factors that lead to increased production, the model for which takes the form of a function y = f (K, l, t) . The yields from technical change (that is, knowledge), conversely to those of factors of capital and work, whose yields always tend to decrease, can grow and therefore sustain growth in the long term. In the total factor productivity (TFP) approach, "technical change" is measured by a residual value, at the same time representing an increase in productivity. In practice, the use of these total factor productivity calculations for Chinese growth must face up to several difficulties. The TFP approach treats technological innovation as a "neutral" element in the production function and does not take into account the improvement in quality of inputs (performance of equipment, competence, and technical skills of the workforce), which are nevertheless the main result of technological innovation. In China, technological innovation is above all a continuous improvement in factors of production, notably of the workforce, rather than the fruit of implantation of radical innovations. In addition, the credibility of Chinese statistics presents another problem. The lack of data or their inconsistency make calculation of Chinese productivity difficult, and add to other well-known difficulties inherent in this kind of exercise. Thus, economists draw sometimes contradictory conclusions concerning China's growth, according to their grasp of the industrial productivity or of the increase in productivity coming from other sources (Rawski 2001) . Even if one accepts the conclusion that Chinese growth is owed more to growth in input factors than to the productivity of such factors, the explanation concerning this inefficient growth remains a mystery. The "technical change" in China is therefore like a black box.
If one considers that the interpretation of economic growth lies not solely in terms of growth in quantity of goods and services, but also in the appearance of new goods and new services, an evolutionist approach to economics, one that takes in learning and innovation, favors a better understanding of Chinese growth. Similarly, the contribution of the accumulation of capital to growth depends not only on its quantity but also on its quality: the choice of investment, the skills of the entrepreneurs and the workforce, or the presence of social advantages are all aspects to be considered, among others. Contrary to the logic of the new classical approach, this learning and innovation approach does not attempt to calculate the part of the contribution of "technical change" to economic growth. It analyzes company characteristics, functioning, and the key elements concerning them, and in doing so evaluates the "social capacity" of a country to integrate systematically technological change and institutional change (Abramovitz 1986 ). This "social capacity" is the source of growth in quality which can overcome the limit posed by falling yields from input factors and can sustain growth in the long term. In this sense, the approach will provide no "explanation" for China's growth; it enables us to better understand the nature of this remarkable growth: Is it based on innovation, or is it just a repetition of something that already happened somewhere else before?
Understanding Technological Learning in Firms

A Brief Review of the Literature
The core part of this evolutionist approach lies in knowing empirically what happens to technological learning in firms. Technological learning is a cumulative process over time, very specific to each firm, and collective in the sense that it involves more than one person inside the company (Arvanitis and Villavicencio 1998; Figueiredo 2002) . Economists have used the notions of "production capabilities" and "technological capabilities" in order to differentiate two resulting paths of technological learning, particularly in the developing countries (Bell and Pavitt 1993, 1995) . These terms encapsulate the notion of "absorptive capacity" introduced by Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal (1990) , in that an enterprise needs to develop sufficient capabilities that permit absorption of the new technologies.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Cohen and Levinthal only discussed the case of rather large and sophisticated economies, and gave particular importance to research and development (R&D). As the literature showed, learning cannot be reduced to R&D, even if it is an essential component. Moreover, R&D is not linked to production or the market in a linear and simple way (Rosenberg et al. 1992) . The existence of an R&D unit is not limited to some large R&D facility with specific research projects; R&D's functions can be much wider, supporting the whole productive process, particularly in small and medium enterprises where it is frequently undercounted (see Acs and Audretsch 1991; Arvanitis and Vonortas 2000; Kleinknecht and Reijnen 1991) .
Since the seminal work on technological learning in the developing world of Jorge Katz and Alice Amsden, a lot of the work has focused on South Korea and Taiwan and the theory of late industrialization, the role of the state, and the creation of international value chains. A theory of the necessary steps to upgrade and attain a certain level of technological development has emerged (Hobday 1995; Kim 1997) . Observing the Taiwanese electronics industry, Hobday (1997) predicted a continuous upgrading from simple suppliers and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to own-brand manufacturers. Gabriela Dutrénit (2000) draws attention to the importance of the transition process from building the minimum knowledge base to building strategic capabilities in latecomer firms. More empirical descriptions of technological learning would identify two types of activities: those that permit the enhancement of products and processes inside the enterprise (internal learning), and activities with the same purpose but in relation to clients, suppliers, and external sources of knowledge (external or interactive learning) (Arvanitis et al. 2006; Pirela et al. 1993) . Internal learning includes activities such as: seeking technological information on alternative technological routes; adaptation of technology; development of better and new products; and adaptation and design of processes. Product and process innovations, strictly speaking, are part of this learning experience, as well as R&D, design, engineering, maintenance, and quality management. External or interactive learning activities can take a very wide variety of forms. Companies that upgrade from productive capabilities to technological capabilities combine internal and interactive learning and, as their experience evolves, they enter a more complex organizational learning. This latter "soft" skill has mostly interested the business management literature mainly on joint ventures. The substantial management literature on joint ventures or foreign companies in China is focused on management issues (Peng and Luo 2000) , investment decisions (Shi 2001) , and, in some cases, on technology transfers (Martinsons and Tseng 1999; Walsh 2003; Wang et al. 2001) . The same issues are less commonly studied in Chinese-owned companies (with some exceptions such as White and Liu 1998; Xie 2004; Xie and Wu 2003; Zhao 2000) .
Technological learning is also seen as a structural feature that goes hand in hand with some special institutional arrangements (Kim 1997) . Learning and achievement in general have been seen as underlying features of Asian societies (Rowen 1998) . There have been an impressive number of studies centered on issues like the national innovation system, institutions, and the overall environmental conditions of industrialization (see, for instance, Chen and Sewell 1996; Lall 1987 Lall , 1991 Lall , 1998 Shin 1996) . The national innovation system approach establishes a direct link between companies' technological practices and the institutions of a country. This involves the placing of companies in a series of institutions and structures other than companies themselves. These structures are a decisive factor for learning behavior and the results of learning undertaken. It systematically takes into account, as two main variables, technological change and institutional change (Freeman 1995) , and therefore also the areas in which the public power intervenes: the protection of certain industries, the promotion of exports, support for certain specific companies, and promotion of R&D. Again the education system, technology transfer, scientific and technical infrastructure, and the financial system also act on innovation and growth. These different institutional arrangements make the difference between countries by adopting, promoting, developing, and diffusing new technologies, new products, and new processes, and create the different speeds of growth. In brief, the particular aspects of economic and social structures of a country offer highly variable possibilities for learning and innovation and thus model the economic performances of a country (Amsden 2001) . The learning and innovation approach attempts to grasp the whole set of institutional determinants of social systems of innovation described by Bruno Amable, Rémy Barré, and Robert Boyer (1997) , which actively support not only the creation of enterprises but also their long-term growth. According to Amable, Barré, and Boyer, the internal organization of the company constructs the system of production. The relations between companies form part of the economic and industrial system. The intensity and organization of research and development are part of the science, technology, and innovation system. State intervention or the mode of regulation plays a transverse role in relation to other institutions or systems of technical change.
The examination of South Korea in the essential work by Alice Amsden (1989) or the publications of Michael Hobday and Linsu Kim showed empirically the importance of institutional arrangements. South Korea invested massively in the setting up of technological research institutions, which provide knowledge and information to large firms. In contrast, Taiwan was in a more dispersed universe of small and medium-size firms. In addition, that country's large-scale entrepreneurs, although they invested in training within their companies, found themselves in the situation of independent actors with little influence on the formation of a scientific and technical system of sufficient standard to meet the requirements of companies. The Taiwanese firms often found the key to success by working in association with a customer, often a foreign one, which offered models, advice, and assistance for ensuring a production that complied with international standards. Some studies such as Gereffi (1999) and Ernst and Kim (2002) have been sought to understand the subcontracting process in East Asian economies and the creation of global chains of supply. One such analysis of the Taiwanese electronics industry (Ernst 2000, 224) emphasizes the diversity of linkages between subcontractors, foreign clients, and providers of technology. Integration in a value chain governed by a foreign multinational company is part of these strategies. This is the method Taiwan adopted, in electronics, a sector that invented the concept of OEM. The institutional arrangements consist also of sources of finance and the role of the local authorities.
Methodology and Data
Very much in line with this work, our research views technological learning of firms as the central piece of late industrialization. Starting from development economics, this research takes China's tremendous economic growth as a historical process of industrialization. But to interpret the macroeconomic statistics, in-depth understanding of what is happening inside enterprises and relevant organizations is essential, since simply applying the standard macroeconomic model to an institutionally different China may be misleading (just like the misapplied use of the national innovation system framework in China at present). Aggregate figures must be reinterpreted by firm-level observation and evidence in China. Another angle of research is rooted in the mixture of industrial economics and sociology. Both emphasize the co-evolution of institutions and technologies. Our term, technological learning, is both technical and institutional. The main analysis route is as follows: in China's real economy firms are different because of their various institutional foundations, which cause them to have dissimilar relations with broader institutional arrangements in the economy. Based on their institutional configurations, firms evolve in several models of operation and constitute what are termed systems of production. These systems of production are the road signs of our analysis. The main part of our analysis is to identify the patterns of technological learning corresponding to these systems of production. Thus institutional and technological change is linked from behind, and a relationship between macro-level institutional arrangements and micro-level technological learning patterns is foreseen.
The first author wrote his doctoral thesis between 2000 and 2004 in China (Zhao 2006). The second author participated in the development of the field work and both worked at refining the methodology and theory behind these observations (Arvanitis 2000; Arvanitis et al. 2003) . The main methodological principle is direct and qualitative observation, supplemented by national and local statistics, as well as unpublished and published documents. The fieldwork for this study was carried out between 1998 and 2003 and is based on visits and investigations of a number of firms and government bodies mainly in the automobile and electronics industries in China.
Case studies are the building blocks of the research. one to two hours were undertaken with firm managers, technicians, and relevant political decision-makers. Specific project documents and internal reports were collected systematically in each interview. The case study approach is an integration of theory and practice, consisting of detailed analysis of each essential function of firm operation along time deployment (investment, installation of equipment, maintaining, manufacturing, marketing, design, procurement, R&D, quality control, technical cooperation, and so on), and then finding the hidden links among these functions. Technological capabilities are eventually represented by the functions and their link types. In the meantime, the reconstructed history of the firm shows how it developed its technological capabilities. Through a number of detailed firm case studies, some patterns of development in technological capabilities emerge.
For the automobile sector, interviews were also carried out with local officials in Beijing and Guangzhou. Cases for Beijing-Chrysler, Shanghai-Volkswagen, and Shanghai-General Motors were based on second data. For the electronic sector, interviews were conducted also with Guangdong provincial officials. The cases involving Haier, Changhong, Legend, and Chunlan were based on existing documents.
Official statistics were collected from the statistics bureaus of several local governments. Reviews of published national statistics, press, and documents supplied more information.
How Did Chinese Firms Develop Technological Capabilities?
The Multiple Learning Patterns
Based on empirical study, we stress that technological upgrading in China has followed a diversified pattern, and Chinese entrepreneurs have always maintained a variety of technology sources, not so much because of some strategy, but rather out of an immediate and pragmatic need: access to technology. In the absence of previous experience, Chinese local firms relied on their foreign clients rather than some public knowledge provider or other external source of technical advice. This may not appear new in the Asian literature; it nonetheless is the actual industrialization process in China: technological learning is taking place in a large variety of medium-size companies, not so much through technology transfers from foreign firms that invest in China (inward FDI) or through some other providers such as universities, technical centers, or consultants, but through their foreign clients. Companies in China are quick learners in a usual catch-up strategy. They are actively engaged in looking abroad for sources of technology and seeking to cooperate with foreign clients in order to have access to better technology. They seek these contacts through various forms and channels, always maintaining the variety of foreign clients and arrangements. This "copy and fabrication" strategy opens up possibilities for larger-scale production, better knowledge, and wider markets. The association with a foreign client is thus strategic to practically all companies that want to go up the value chain, approach the technological frontier, and access more lucrative local markets. This simple and plain conclusion is based on observations of all types of firms in China, and has profound implications for China's current development model and policy.
Compared with other emerging economic blocs, the development of China's technological and industrial capabilities has always been characterized by the diversity of types of firm. The first set of systems of production was apparent in the first wave of economic growth: these were the famous firms of small towns and villages. These companies, which appeared at the beginning of the 1980s, operate like private enterprises, but because of ideological blockages, present themselves as "collectives." At present they make up the core of the "private sector" in China, as Gilles Guiheux recalls. Today these companies are experiencing great difficulties in modernization and growth. Their activity is founded on manual processes, simple technologies, and just small workshops. And they have only scant knowledge of either technical or marketing aspects.
The production systems of Chinese operators abroad appear in the second wave of investment: companies with Taiwanese and Hong Kong investors work essentially in producing clothing, textiles, shoes, electronics, and domestic appliances. These firms share some common productive characteristics with those of the first wave, but they also have specific traits: already well-established networks of suppliers and customers, a higher level of complexity of productive technologies, even if they are still in the world of relatively unsophisticated industries, and strong relations with local authorities. These larger companies also use a cheap labor force but are often linked up to global markets. Devoted to exports, they represent the strongest potential for growth and serve above all as a model for new enterprises backed by Chinese capital.
The third-wave investment essentially originates from large companies in industrialized countries. Many "third-generation" production systems are now governed by foreign enterprises. These new systems of production are still in a phase that could be called preliminary and foreign companies can now have a glimpse of the difficulties that every firm has to confront, whatever country they are installed in. Everything is clearer for a foreign company: land purchase, construction, installation of equipment, recruitment and training of employees, communication with the parent company, relations with inspection offices of work and environment authorities, and commercial relations with suppliers. Installation of complete systems of production costs more than working jointly with a local supplier. This generation of firms arising from Japanese, Korean, and Western capital is also seeking to take advantage of low-cost labor, but invest in higher-technology production and operate with proven management and financial control models. They have better knowledge of both Chinese and international markets. Such firms also act as a model for certain Chinese firms in pharmaceuticals, electronics, and telecommunications. They recruit the cream of Chinese engineers and managers by offering them more than just attractive salaries: the possibility for a rich and "modern" consumer lifestyles.
These emerging production systems have seen dazzling growth. However, they coexist with state firms. They are literally superimposed on this social, economic, and political base that the state firms constitute. Western economists are therefore right to show a special interest in their fate (such as Jefferson et. al. 1992 Jefferson et. al. , 2000 Lardy 1998 ). Although the state companies have lost many markets to the benefit of new production systems, they still maintain favorable access to financial resources. Access was also easier for them for other types of resources such as public centers of research, and they had the support of schools and universities. In fact, state firms have not used their favorable access possibilities to financial resources just to invest in production. Over the past two decades, a large proportion of their investments were made in accommodations for employees and financing social security and pensionsin other words, social benefits for their employees in order to maintain the political status quo and social stability in China. In this respect, the example of other Asian countries is not much help. Indeed, only China has had to ensure the maintenance and change of such a collection of state enterprises and social and political organizations. Numerous studies seek to assess the capability for increasing productivity in these companies which appears in many respects quite flimsy. The crux of the issue for state firms is to improve their production capacity and support the creation of innovation capability. Some rare firms have grown really strongly, but always with substantial support from the state. This is the case of firms like Huawei-one of the world's largest telecommunications equipment and network management firms, based in Shenzhen-or Sanjiu 999 in pharmaceutical products derived from traditional Chinese medicine, to mention only a couple of firms in the region.
The Forces Behind Learning and Growth
The firms mentioned above have promoted technological learning in Chinese industry. The intense rate at which they appeared was the result of massive investment in a certain period, and operation of each type of firm has generated its own independent production system. In a similar way to a company's technological learning, China's industrial development is an accumulative process, which is different for different firms. In the 1980s, the accumulation of rural firms was greater than that of state firms, and the accumulation of Taiwanese firms was based on long-existing Hong Kong and Macao companies. In the 1990s, multinational companies and private Chinese firms joined in. The upsurge and continuing accumulation of these new firms and connected production systems are the source of China's industrial development. This development did not result from a continual growth of a certain type of company for the past twenty years. Although some enterprises (especially local ones) succeeded unceasingly in accommodating changes in the market, technology, and organization, most are experiencing no less decay and stagnation. In China, the continuous increase in the number of firms in fact represents a strong continual process of duplication and reproduction, which has increased considerably the capacity of supply (productive capacity). The firm is the driving force behind the development of Chinese industry's technological capabilities. And the development of China's industry is characterized by the diversity of its enterprises.
The specific model of technological learning in Chinese industry was induced by the freeing-up of demand following the 1980s. China is considered the world's most vast market because of the country's high population. This point of view is a little naïve, but effectively a large number of demands are not satisfied. The scope and the lack of satisfaction of market demands mean that any market trial of new products and innovative technologies can be carried out. For example, the successful reform in the rural regions and the relative slow rate of urban reform in the 1980s created an enormous vacuum in the market and rural firms took advantage of this. The declining state firms and local-authority-run firms in urban areas were incapable of supplying enough usual consumer products to satisfy the great demands of the market. Clear-sighted rural entrepreneurs, local governments, and traders discovered these growing needs and harnessed finance to quickly set up firms to make the products the market needed. This is how the firms from villages and small towns established the consumer electronics industry.
However, the vast market in China is not a market that includes demands at all levels. In general, this market is still at the primary level of demand, and consumers are not exacting concerning the quality of products. In spite of rapid growth in the size of the market, this represents a more repetitive mode of consumption, spread and ever extended over the vast Chinese territory. Consumers' low disposable income leads to a demand for ordinary conventional products, and consumers are highly sensitive to product prices. For Chinese industry, the fabulous internal market is at its peak for absorbing conventional products from these sectors, and in this way extremely favorable conditions for expanding productive capacity in these sectors are created. The growing production capacity of Chinese industry is indeed founded on ever-increasing demand from the internal market.
The growing internal demand has driven firms to undergo a technological learning process through a continual increase in their production. It has also caused it to fall into the trap of technological learning at a low level. The use of the country's cheap labor force in large-scale production and the low disposable income of consumers have caused demand for the products marketed not to be exacting and induced firms to refrain from raising their technological capacity in product areas, technological circulation, and their behavior on the external markets. In any case, the conventional products from large-scale production can all be sold, so why spend more money and effort in tackling technological learning? Because the products of Chinese industry are often sold by the intermediary of representatives, the firm only knows the immediate clients (retailers), and is often isolated from the users of these products and from any market, thus it does not know the "market" for its products. This means that the links in industry are in reality rather strong links between the producer and his clients, whereas those between the producers' design ability, the product end-use, and the market in a wider sense remain very weak. Consequently, rare are the firms in Chinese industry that are capable of closely following the changes in habits and needs of customers and end users, and that can take these changes into account in the design and commercialization of their products to constantly readjust their strategy in a highly competitive business environment. Some markets of exported Chinese products must face up to demands that are complicated and exacting, but as subsidiaries of multinational companies or subcontracting firms, they have no direct liaison with the foreign markets. Such links exist rather between firms as users of technology and the foreign companies as suppliers of technology. That has greatly lowered the chances of learning up-to-date technology. The demand conditions are the main driving force for technological learning in Chinese industry, which means interaction between the large-scale production capacity of Chinese industry and soaring needs for conventional products, but not for good-quality ones and the use of these products, and not the greatest sources of industrial innovation of users.
After the1980s, many firms entered into competition in the market. These firms were created, as mentioned above, and proliferated in the waves of investment that occurred over twenty years, and in each wave of investment, new firms surged up around old ones. These new firms still reproduced the products and technologies of the old companies and rarely renewed old production methods. The considerable multiplication of firms in many sectors resulted in tough, cruel competition between the firms in many sectors, such as the electronics industry. Essentially, it was price competition. For survival, the firms were obliged to do everything possible to cut costs and sales prices, even at the risk of incurring deficits, in the hope that competitors might leave the market as soon as possible. Then, price competition became one of the principal driving forces behind the behavior of Chinese industry, and technological learning just a by-product. The cause lies in the limitation of the development of the technological capacity in the two paths mentioned, parallel with the late industrialization of China. Among the different kinds of competition between firms in Chinese industry, one finds not only competition between local firms, but also competition between firms in which multinational companies have invested, and between foreign capital-based enterprises and imported goods. In the sectors that were gradually opened up and competitive, such as mobile communications equipment, cars, and office equipment, foreign investment-backed firms used advanced technology much more in the second half of the 1990s. This was not mainly due to the guidance and encouragement of the Chinese government with regard to direct foreign investment; it was because with their development on the Chinese market, the foreign capital-based firms found themselves faced with fierce competition. The needs of competition obliged these firms to renew their technologies and products, reducing costs and selling prices in order to survive on the Chinese market.
By comparison with the quite full competition between the firms, cooperation between them is much less strong. The lack of a legal governance framework provides the activities of firms with a creative spirit a structure that gives sufficient stimulation, but pushes them to deploy their resources in activities that do not produce revenue-generating research. Under the influence of the "unit"-based system, firms never had any tradition of mutual links or cooperation between them. This situation has not changed much, even since industrial reform. The old firms are mistrustful toward the new ones, and vice versa. And new companies, because of the highly changeable economic situation, can only adopt a suspicious and mistrustful attitude toward each other. All transactions are short, because there is no system guaranteeing full execution of contracts. Exchange and cooperation between such firms must count on other means that are principally personal links, and it is highly difficult to forge confident ties between the firms. Competition, and only competition, constitutes the whole link between industrial companies. This situation marked by a lack of cooperation-based links seriously hinders the creation and spread of technological knowledge in the sector. The effect is that many firms can rely only on an introverted kind of learning: in reality, they are occupied in repeating the things that other firms have already done. That sort of product stands up to competition always by means of a low price, so everyone tries to beat down the price and the same cycle is always repeated. We can say that in China, a market economy system has gradually been created akin to a regime. The factor of free competition in this system is really a powerful force pushing the firm toward technological learning, and other factors have no involvement in it.
The Nature of Chinese Economic Growth
Economic growth in China is therefore a result of emerging systems of production. These systems were in the past piled up one over the other on top of the state production system. They constitute the "cycle" or the "wave" in the Chinese economy, in Schumpeter's term. Each productive system has in the end quite a short life span useful to sustain growth. Over time, it is the constant introduction of new systems of production that pulls growth along, not the permanence itself of any one of them. Thus, even if the state production system incessantly draws financial resources from the stock exchange and the bank, overall, the economy expands. Furthermore, the different emerging systems interact and create demand which feeds each of them. World Bank statistics indicate that, for 1998, 62 percent of GNP was produced by the emerging production systems. This is why we can say that the production systems in China do not have productive efficiency but generate the growth of the country's economy overall. Seeing that the emergence of each system is a unique phenomenon and that the system cannot be duplicated, support of this model of growth depends on the possibility of finding or introducing new systems of production.
Chinese economic growth can therefore be understood almost completely by this growth in investments, and the level of demand is neither very important nor very sophisticated. The demand is therefore highly sensitive to market prices and not to the quality of the supply. That leads firms to engage in an essentially priceoriented competition. It is quite usual to see companies which cannot sustain a higher price than the manufacturing cost. The price tends to fall below cost. The companies thus have little margin for investing in longer-term activities such as R&D or the high-level engineering necessary for improving product processes and design. At the same time, this weakens the potential for high profits generated by innovation-based production and more technologically sophisticated growth rather than mass production of low-price products. By imitation of one by the other, learning in these systems of production in China hinges more on production capacity than on innovation. Chinese growth is still constrained by the tendency toward decreasing revenues. Once the new system is nowhere to be found, growth will be slowed or even halted.
However, it is difficult to pretend that institutional change is in itself responsible for economic growth. An observer who does not dwell on the institutions and observes the economic process as a physical one will see that there is no mystery behind China's economic growth. The growth model is fundamentally the same as that observed during the "miracle" of the dragons of South-East Asia, Japan, or even England at the beginning of its industrialization, or the United States, or again the Netherlands. The modernization of Taiwan is, from this point of view, a reduced model of the growth of mainland China. The change of institutions modifies only the rate of growth, but the increase in wealth-growth-shows a strong, direct dependence on the continuous investment of companies and the production of better output. It is in this sense that what Krugman said about the Asian miracle is also true for China: this miracle is a myth.
Why Has Chinese Industrialization Not Yet Led to Innovation?
The industrialization of China has been going on now for twenty years. However, there are no firms yet that have reached global-level competitiveness. Many studies have shown that for twenty years these firms have not improved their efficiency in use of resources. Firms in general still operate with a short-term view and with no substantial improvement in their productivity. There are exceptions, but all indications suggest that in their context, they will remain exceptions for quite a long time, because there are few factors that are pushing firms to improve. Chinese firms learned from foreign companies, but they often stopped at the capability of production and investment, seldom going further to the innovation stage. Why has such a massive and long-term industrialization, which went so far as to make the country into the "world's factory," not led to innovation? On the outside, when innovation observers look at China, they now find that all the institutions, organization, and factors necessary to form a dynamic national innovation system already exist in the country, backed up by a state determined to achieve indigenous innovation. Why, then, does China not yet innovate? The key lies in the mismatch between the dominant way of technological learning practiced by most dynamic firms in the country (mainly non-state firms) and the dominant innovation systems constructed through state policies aiming at helping large state firms. Neither the current system of research, nor the system of education, nor the financial system, nor the national innovation policy constitute recourse to development of the technological capability of mainstream firms in China.
A National System of Science and Technology
In order to change the situation characterized by the separation of science and technology from production, China began, in the 1980s, to change the science and technology system. From 1987, China gradually reduced the running expenses of research institutions, with the result that tertiary-level faculties are always seeking funds for research to sustain their existence. The reform involving commercialization of research institutions and tertiary-level faculties caused a surge in technological firms launched by those institutions. Some of them have succeeded; but the advanced capabilities of Chinese scientists in influential research institutions are seriously reduced. Moreover, with the maturing of Chinese industry, the new companies set up by the research institutions and the tertiary-level faculties became more and more rare. Their links with industry stem mainly from the establishment of their own firms and very seldom do they work with existing companies in innovation. China's research-institutions reform is not at all complete. On the one hand the powers that be hope that these institutions will metamorphose into working entities responsible for their profits and losses. On the other hand, they have been unable to resolve the question of an incentive system for researchers and technical professionals who create businesses. In spite of several years of effort, the situation whereby the technology and education system is separated from that of industry has not undergone any radical change.
Alongside the development of industrial reform, China is striving to put into operation large-scale research and development projects controlled and planned by the central government. The objective of these projects is to help state enterprises to raise their technological level. However, the small and medium-size firms and non-state firms benefit little from them. Although the aim of the elaboration and execution of these science and technology projects is to assist large enterprises, very few firms participate in the process of devising them. The funds for the national plans for science and technology come mainly from public finances. The criterion that guides judgment of the quality of projects accomplished is the degree of satisfaction of the government, not that of the enterprises. Thus no true bridge has really been built between production and research. In contrast, science and technology promotion projects initiated by local authorities, such as local science and technology centers, innovation centers, the local industrial groupings most recently in vogue, have furthered the technological learning of local firms to a certain extent, in spite of their insufficiencies. In general, the Chinese technology and education systems are not yet able to supply the production system with sufficiently advanced factors of production.
The Financial System
As to financing, the Chinese financial system remains essentially a structure in which the circulation and availability of capital are controlled by government and not by any market mechanism. Funds do exist outside the sphere of the national plan and distribution mechanism, but these are used more for redistribution and transfer of money and speculation, not for investment in development of technological innovation capacity.
The most striking characteristic of the Chinese finance system is that it is almost entirely government controlled and has the objective of maximizing the right to state property and controlling the industrial enterprises; it systematically provides funds to a range of investment activities connected to state firms. In this system, the government is the largest intermediary financing organization. It affects the planned transfer and provision of funds from the inhabitants to the state industrial sector (Zhang 2002) . Before the reform, the state budget was the principal channel for funding ensured by the government for the benefit of the industrial sector. The government uses farm-price manipulation to effect the redistribution of national revenue, and the distorted agricultural-sector prices are in reality utilized for redistributing funds from people in the rural regions to the state industrial sector. China's reform and opening-up made it impossible to provide investment in the form of shares to state enterprises because of falling public revenues, whereas the financial resources of inhabitants increased enormously. The government therefore began to increasingly use the state monopoly banking system to finance the state industrial sector, and this system has become the main mechanism for financing state firms. Between 1985 and 1995, a large number of state enterprises were set up (some of them were successful as already mentioned) and the founding of some of them was made possible entirely thanks to bank loans. These firms endowed with rights to debt therefore had no shares right from the outset. Because the banking system is monopolized by state banks, even working according to the international standard, many banks have already collapsed. However, a large proportion of Chinese inhabitants have no choice but to deposit their money in state banks, in the absence of other channels for deposit and investment. And through the state banks, they were lending their money to enterprises that were quite inefficient. An estimated 70 percent of loans in China were issued to state firms. When the loans from banks to state industrial sectors incurred increasingly bad debts, the government started to use the shares market with a view to transforming the funds from inhabitants in the interior of the country into investment in the state firms. Often, such firms are the only ones chosen to be quoted on the shares market on the stock exchange and, moreover, foreign companies can associate themselves only with state enterprises in certain sectors. When these associations of firms change into joint ventures and get themselves quoted in the shares market, their old state shares will not be sold and consequently in the two cases mentioned above, new non-state funds are introduced.
Nevertheless these funds introduced into the state industrial sectors by government action were not used entirely for activities beneficial to the development of firms' technological capacity. Many of these resources were employed just to keep the enterprise alive, pay heavy social burdens, resolve the question of employment, and ensure social stability. Even where funds were utilized in technology-related activities (usually called "technological transformation"), most went to purchase equipment and not to patent licenses or key technologies, and not for personnel training, either. Conversely, it is very difficult for emerging private firms and others backed by foreign capital, highly motivated in technological learning, to acquire sufficient funds and financial services from the state banking system. Private firms with a creative spirit essentially count on self-financing at their launch and on finance by way of personal relations networks; after the hard struggle for growth, these companies opt for being quoted abroad in order to finance the business they run within the country; aside from this, there are government-imposed limitations on private enterprises' being quoted on the country's stock exchange. This means that investments intended for innovation in China are extremely rare. There are virtually no government-controlled funds utilized for innovation; those few that do exist are invested in the centers of innovation and technology springing up on the initiative of local authorities. There is practically no venture-capital market. The venture-capital companies in fact conduct quite efficient fund-distribution operations in an inefficient capital market, and from the point of view of the capital market system that has developed, such operations just represent the normal throes of finance and investment.
The Ambiguous Role of Government Policies
China practices a planned economy, and it is the government that exerts control and intervenes in all sectors of the economy. Behind the systems of research, education, and finance, there is the hand of the Chinese government. However, in development, the active intervention of the Chinese government often plays a negative role, not a positive one, in stark contrast with the developed countries of East Asia represented by Japan and the Republic of Korea. For example, the government subsidizes state-level firms and practices a policy of protection of state enterprises in certain industrial sectors. To ensure their survival, the government employs administrative means, artificially lowers interest rates, the exchange rate, and other price factors so that these firms can acquire cheap input products. Moreover, it grants them the monopoly of the internal market, or prevents competing products from abroad from entering the internal market through imposition of excessive customs duties. The protected firms are hence sheltered from any pressure and are scarcely motivated toward learning and innovation; their efficiency and profit levels are low. Even with China's accession to the World Trade Organization, the government still protects the sectors in which state enterprises are prominent by various means. Most significantly, still no competition-geared policy is practiced by the state-owned industrial sectors, not even for the internal market.
The Chinese government also insists on the export of firms' products, the aim being to earn foreign currency, which is also the main objective of Chinese foreign trade policy. This situation leads firms to accomplish their government-assigned task of earning foreign currency and to do everything possible to make more industrial products marketed at cheap, even loss-making prices, instead of raising the added value of products by dint of hard effort, because the foreign currency earned by companies belongs to the government. And it is always the government that absorbs the deficit. The foreign currency exchanged against the exported products is used by state firms to buy equipment destined to further technological transformation. Nevertheless, the aim of bringing technology into China is to localize production. The state firms and the planned system have the effect that localization has not brought enterprises the forces necessary for driving innovation and learning. On the contrary, it has tied them onto a rut of low-level technology. In the 1990s, technological learning of state firms, vigorously supported by the government, had no effect. China therefore adopted what was known as a "market against technology" tactic in the hope of raising firms' technological capacity by introducing foreign direct capital. This "market against technology" ploy was in some cases crowned with success. For example, Japan allowed Western companies access to sales and subcontracted sales channels through alliances with Japanese firms. Nevertheless, while the Western companies were still able to count on their Japanese partners for selling their products, the Japanese firms gradually built up their technological capacities. The early 1980s saw European and American companies starting to lose their technological domination in many fields, and Western countries were obliged to open up their market to Japanese firms. Simple agreements for permission and joint ventures in technological cooperation between Japanese firms and Western companies were transformed step-by-step into a higher-level technological alliance.
Conversely, Chinese policy with regard to direct foreign investment is more concerned with control of finance and short-term financial profits, neglecting technological learning and long-term generation of technological capacity. In the past twenty years, the Chinese markets for automobiles, beverages, consumer cosmetics, radio and communication equipment, and photographic film and equipment have been occupied successively by foreign companies. State enterprises have been unable to acquire the technology while leaving the market to foreign companies. Besides, it is not from the point of view of technological development that Chinese direct foreign investment and external trade policies are conceived and coordinated. Direct foreign investment has brought China the capacity for assembly and processing work, but at the same time it has usurped the greater part of export of Chinese products. Let us take an example: in 2000, 92.5 percent of computers and 96.4 percent of exported mobile telephone communication products were manufactured by direct foreign capital-backed firms in China, whereas exports by state enterprises in which the government had high hopes were decreased year by year. One cannot simply equate China's industrial technological capacity with the technological capacity of state firms, because direct foreign investment corresponds to a large proportion of the country's industrial technological learning. However, the decision makers of Chinese industrial policy are generally not yet completely aware that in the new situation of economic globalization, coordination of national industrial policy with those of foreign investments and external trade can have a beneficial effect on the development of industrial technology. In the process of direct foreign investment input, China has no systematic policy for supporting technological learning in small and medium-size local firms which undertake joint production for multinational companies. It also lacks any project for training in local firms that have potential for becoming the structural framework for technological learning in the networks of multinational companies. Some relatively well-adapted policies still remain in China, such as industrial technology policies that are able to take full advantage of very low salaries, low cost of land, and moderate costs of raw materials.
Insufficient systematization also has some historic causes. China's social structure was for many long years based on the "unit system" such that each organization clearly belonged to the vertical system of functioning and there was no horizontal communication or collaboration. After China's reform and opening-up, the "unit system" continued to survive in spite of the many other methods adopted. The routines of actions molded by the unit system will be very difficult to change for a long time (Miège 2005) . The construction of an innovation system in China consequently lacks a social foundation.
Conclusion: China Technology, Inc.?
How can Chinese firms develop their technological capabilities? The answer to this question is much more important than that to the question "What is the level of technological capabilities of these firms?" This is because the Chinese firms' specific technological level may be bypassed tomorrow, but the process of learning new technology will stay in the core as an ultimate technology for firms' future development. Has China developed an innovative and unique method of technological learning-a kind of Chinese technology? The development trajectories of automobile and electronics firms in China, firms in two of the most developed industries in the country, show that the answer to this question is "No."
China, since the beginning of the 1980s, has been carrying out a massive movement of foreign technology acquisition throughout its industrial firms. Over the past twenty-five years, Chinese firms developed two patterns of technological learning. Simply put, one is based on the traditional arrangement of technology transfer, which is the model adopted by most state firms, represented by automobile firms in the form of joint ventures and large state-owned electronic firms in the 1980s and 1990s. This pattern of technology transfer emphasizes the thorough assimilation of technological and the underlying scientific knowledge. The key process is "reverse engineering" followed by continuous quality improvement, product development from imitation to innovation, and economic transition from import substitution to export orientation. Japan and South Korea to some degree are the successful examples of this model. The South Korean experience shows that the switch from basic productive capability to a more complex technological capability is linked, but not exclusively, to the introduction of R&D, to some organizational sophistication, and to the integration of technology and markets in the strategy of the firm (Kim 2001 ). The Chinese government fully supported this pattern of technology transfer, interfered in the transfer process within firms directly or indirectly, and sometimes even forced the transfer behavior. Correspondingly, the Chinese government elaborated a series of industrial and technological policies in service of this model, built up institutional infrastructures to promote the imitation of innovation processes, and reinforced Chinese basic research and industry linkages with the purpose of drawing indigenous technological capabilities from technology transfer. The current national innovation system modulated by government exemplifies this method of technological learning by firms.
But there was another method of learning in China, practiced mostly in the non-state firms (many of them in the electronics industry) emerging after China's economic reform and open-door policy. This model of learning that the most dynamic Chinese enterprises are experiencing can trace its origins to the East Asian catch-up model (see, for example, Hobday 1997). In fact, what our research found is that learning in these emerging Chinese enterprises has not created a new paradigm for the learning literature. On the contrary, the learning experience of the Chinese enterprises is an ordinary process, a follower of the Southeast Asian model. Even firms advancing more rapidly toward an innovation frontier are in this pragmatic, down-to-earth, catch-up model, cumulatively upgrading production and control knowledge. These firms introduce new models as long as their foreign clients provide them with new blueprints. Firms that seem to enter a transitional stage in upgrading from basic productive learning to more sophisticated technology learning maintain the same diversified types of contacts with their clients, aggregating more sources of knowledge and trying to keep a multiplicity of external sources. These firms follow a mixed pattern of interactive learning, maintaining a variety of sources of technology, keeping a large portfolio of clients and products, accepting to be both OEM providers for some products and an autonomous brand for others, depending on the market.
During the last twenty-five years, the progressively fierce competition in the Chinese market caused non-state emerging firms to rise and state-owned enterprises to fall. Thus the practical learning pattern prevailed over the formal transfer pattern in industry. But these emerging firms obtained little support or backup from the arrangements of Chinese innovation systems due to their institutional status. Even some local governments begun to construct supporting arrangements for these firms by promoting local industrial clusters (as in Guangdong province), and state innovation policy is still biased toward serving state firms. There is a deep institutional and organizational gap between the dominant practice of technology development in mainstream firms with strong catch-up characteristics and the legitimate system of innovation set up by the government with its target of indigenous innovation. Except for the few Chinese superstar companies which are innovative and accidentally met government expectations, because they practiced interactive learning at the same time benefiting from innovation systems due to their special status (such as Lenovo, Haier, and Huawei, which began to have international expansion), most of China's emerging firms are continuing to reinforce their capability of production and investment instead of upgrading to innovation, and some are even beginning to expand these production capabilities abroad.
